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VALIDITY OF PATENTS CONVEYING NAVIGABLE
WATERBOTTOMS-ACT 62 OF 1912,
PRICE, CARTER, AND ALL THAT
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
It has been a well-established general proposition of Louisiana civil law that the beds or bottoms of navigable waters are
public things, inalienable by the state and forever insusceptible
of private ownership.' An involved course of legislative and judicial action, however, has resulted in recent years in the recognition, under certain circumstances, 2 of private ownership in the
beds of navigable waters such as rivers, lakes, and bays.
Originally, the prohibition against alienation by the state of
its navigable waters was based upon the interpretation placed
by the courts on articles 449, 450, and 453 of the Civil Code.
The first direct prohibition occurred in 1886, when Act 1063 of
that year declared that the state owned all waters adjoining the
Gulf and at the same time provided that the public ownership
of these waters should be continued and maintained. Subsequently, the prohibition against alienation was fortified by the judicial
doctrine of "inherent sovereignty,14 and, finally, by the adoption
of a constitutional provision in 1921 which prohibits alienation
of "the bed of any navigable stream, lake or other body of water,
except for purposes of reclamation."'5 In the meanwhile, however, Act 247 of 1855 had authorized the sale by the state of shallow non-navigable lakes and swamplands recently acquired
under grant from the United States, and Act 124 of 1882 had assimilated dried up navigable lakes to swamplands and had re* Professor

of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See generally 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY, §§ 30-32 (1966).
See also concurring opinion by Justice Barham in Carter v. Moore, 258 La.
921, 937-38, 248 So. 2d 813, 818 (1971):

"All doctrine and all jurisprudence

with only slight inconsistencies, even recent jurisprudence including California Co. v. Price, recognize that even before the Constitution of 1921 (the
Constitution only placed alienation beyond legislative authority) the bottoms
of all navigable waters belonged to the State, and that it was inimical to
public policy to permit private ownership."
2. Private ownership of navigable waterbottoms may derive from grant
or patent only. It may not derive from accretion or dereliction. Compare
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954) with Miami Corp. v. State,
186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
3. See La. Acts 1886, No. 106, now LA. R.S. 49:3 (1950). See also La. Acts
1892, No. 110; La. Acts 1896, No. 121; La. Acts 1902, No. 153; La. Acts 1904,
No. 52; La. Acts 1924, No. 139; La. Acts 1932, No. 67; La. Acts 1938, No. 55.
4. Apparently, the doctrine was first announced in State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912). For detailed discussion, see A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAW PROPERTY § 32 (1965).
5. See generally 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY, .§§ 30-32 (1966).
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moved the prohibition against the alienation of such lands. On
the basis of these and subsequent similar statutes, patents were
issued by the state purporting to convey to private interests or to
public bodies large areas containing both navigable and nonnavigable waters. No special mention was made reserving title
to navigable waterbottoms in the state, and several years thereafter the question arose as to whether or not such patents could
convey title to the bottoms of navigable waters.
In order to promote security of title, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 62 of 1912, a repose statute. This Act declared:
"All suits or proceedings of the State of Louisiana, private corporations, partnerships or persons to vacate and annul any patent issued by the State of Louisiana, duly signed
by the Governor of the State and the Register of the State
Land Office, and of record in the State Land Office, or any
transfer of property by any subdivision of the State, shall
be brought only within six years of the issuance of the patent,
provided that suits to annul patents previously issued shall
''6
be brought within six years from the passage of this Act.
The same act was re-enacted in the Louisiana Revised Statutes
of 1950 to read:
"Actions, including those by the State of Louisiana, to
annul any patent issued by the state duly signed by the governor and the register of the state land office, and of record
in the state land office, are prescribed by six years, reckoning
from the day of the issuance of the patent."
On the basis of Act 62 of 1912, Louisiana courts have held that
patents which included beds of navigable waters without reserving title to them in the state are valid and no longer assailable. 8
6. La. Acts 1912, No. 62. For a legislative

interpretation of this act, see

text accompanying note 57 infra.
7. LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950); cf. id. 9:1107-1109 (1950). Presumably, the original version is still pertinent for the determination of issues arising under
its regime. See Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 199

So.2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
8. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954); Humble Oil
& Ref. Co. v. State Mineral Bd.. 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839 (1953); O'Brien v.
State Mineral Bd., 209 La. 266, 24 So.2d 470 (1945); Realty Operators, Inc. v.
State Mineral Bd., 202 La. 398, 12 So.2d 198 (1942); State v. Sweet Lake Land
& Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927). For a convincing criticism of these
decisions, see concurring opinion by Justice Barham in Carter v. Moore, 258
La. 921, 940-55, 248 So.2d 813, 820-25 (1971).
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It is in this way that Louisiana arrived at private ownership of
the bottoms of navigable waters.
In the last few years, Louisiana courts have reconsidered
the proper interpretation and scope of application of the 1912
repose statute in a number of important cases. It is the purpose
of this Article to determine the validity of state patents conveying navigable waterbottoms to private interests in the light of
Louisiana legislation and recent jurisprudence.
Scope of Application of Act 62 of 1912;
Relevance of Prior Legislation
At the time Act 62 of 1912 was enacted, Louisiana legislation
prohibited alienation of navigable waterbottoms to private interests. Question, therefore, has arisen whether the 1912 statute
was intended to apply to all patents indiscriminately or only
to patents that did not include the beds of navigable waters.
Since it is clear that the Louisiana legislature could, due to the
absence of constitutional prohibition at that time, authorize the
sale of navigable waters, it is merely a problem of statutory
interpretation whether Act 62 of 1912 intended to cure patents
conveying only non-navigable waters or both navigable and nonnavigable waters. The majority view in the celebrated case of
CaliforniaCo. v. Price was that "the legislature intended that the
Act was to be all-inclusive, in conformity with the language used
therein."9 A vigorous dissent indicated that "a reasonable construction of the statute would be that it only applies to property
".'."0 The reasoning of the majority
susceptible of ownership. .
opinion in the Price decision has been subjected to criticism on
a variety of counts.' It is indeed a strained interpretation of a
repose statute to maintain that it repealed by implication all prior
legislation expressly prohibiting alienation of navigable waters
and that it rendered valid patents that were absolute nullities
at the time they were issued. As a prescriptive statute, Act 62
of 1912 is stricti juris and must be narrowly construed. 12 Be that
9. 225 La. 706, 739, 74 So.2d 1, 12 (1954).
10. Id. at 757, 74 So.2d at 17.
11. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1954
Term-Property, 15 LA. LAw REv. 273, 275 (1955); Hebert & Lazarus, Survey
of the 1954 Louisiana Legislation--Legislation Affecting the Civil Code, 15
LA. L. REV. 9, 21-25 (1954); concurring opinion by Justice Barham in Carter
v. Moore, 258 La. 921, 933, 248 So.2d 813, 817 (1971).
12. See Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 199 So.2d
554, 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967): "Nevertheless, the terms of the 1912 pre-
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as it may, the narrow holding of the Price decision is that pre1886 patents have been rendered unassailable by Act 62 of 1912,
and this holding continues to control in the present state of
Louisiana jurisprudence.
The question whether the 1912 statute intended to cure patents
issued after 1886 contrary to express legislative prohibition, namely, patents that were absolute nullities at the time issued, remains
open-dicta in the Price decision to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, it might be extravagant to assert, for example, that
the 1912 statute intended to cure patents issued fraudulently. In
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Delacroix Corp.,' 8 a concursus proceeding for the distribution of oil and gas royalties, private persons
claimed the ownership of certain navigable waterbottoms by
virtue of a 1902 patent. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal set
aside a summary judgment, rendered by the lower court in favor
of the claimants, on the ground that the case involved a genuine
dispute as to facts, namely, allegations by the state that the
patents in question had been obtained fraudulently. This disposition is an application of the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has recently
reiterated its conviction that the 1912 repose statute did not intend to cure patents issued in violation of Louisiana legislation
prohibiting the alienation of navigable waterbottoms which, at
the time they were issued, were absolute nullities. In Stevens v.
State Mineral Board,14 plaintiffs brought an action against the
state mineral board to remove "clouds"' 15 from their title to certain waterbottoms on the east coast of Louisiana. The clouds
consisted of recorded mineral leases granted by the state to private interests. Defendants moved for a summary judgment on
the grounds that the state owned the property in question by
virtue of an adjudication for non-payment of taxes, and that four
links in plaintiffs' title were fatally defective. Plaintiffs invoked
in their favor the repose statute of 1912. The court considered
scription statute determine its application, and we cannot extend its scope
to protect analogous transactions. Prescription is stricti juris and prescriptive statutes cannot be extended by analogy to cases beyond the strict letter
of the law."
13. 235 So.2d 187 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
14. 221 So.2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), reud, 255 La. 857, 233 So.2d 542
(1970).
15. The action to remove a cloud from title is a non-statutory "fringe"
or "quasi-real" action for the protection of ownership. See LA. CODS CIV. P.
tit. II, Introduction.
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only the question of the validity of plaintiffs' title and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs' title
was based on two transfers, dated April 2, 1895, and July 27, 1910,
by the State of Louisiana to Lake Borgne Levee District, and on
two patents which recited that the Plaquemines Land Company
acquired the property from the State of Louisiana and from the
Lake Borgne Levee District on September 20, 1911. The court
distinguished Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral
Board,1 and held, on the authority of Humble Oil & Refining Co.
v. State Mineral Board,'7 that the transfer of the property by
the state to the levee district was covered by the repose statute
of 1912. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the patents by the
levee district to private interests were absolute nullities that
could not be cured by the repose statute. Plaintiff's argument
that the case was controlled by the decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in California Co. v. Price' was rejected. The
Price case was distinguished on the ground that the patent involved therein had been issued in 1874, long before the enactment
of the first Louisiana "oyster"' 9 statute. And, apparently drawing
20
an argument a contrariofrom language in the Price decision,
16. 199 So.2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), text accompanying note 32
infra. The basis of the distinction was that the cited case involved a transfer by the State to private individuals whereas "in the instant case the
transfer was by a subdivision of the State to private interests." Stevens v.
State Mineral Bd., 221 So.2d 645, 646 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). A better basis
of distinction would be that the Coastal States case involved a sale whereas the Stevens case involved the validity of a patent.
17. 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839 (1953). In this case, navigable waterbottoms
transferred by the state to a levee district were subsequently sold by the
levee district to private individuals. Since the sale took place in 1901, and
acquirer's title was questioned by the state only in 1950, the court held that
the matter was controlled by the repose statute of 1912: the title was valid
and unassailable.
18. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
19. See note 3 supra.
20. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 722, 74 So.2d 1, 7 (1954): "The
recital [in the oyster statutes] that the described waterbottoms 'shall be,
continue and remain the property of the State of Loiusiana,' which is principally relied on by counsel, has reference only to such bottoms as have
not been conveyed by the State theretofore to private interests; and to them,
obviously the 1912 Act cannot have any application." From this language,
the court in the Stevens case drew an argument a contrario that "as to
property thereafter conveyed to private parties" the 1912 Act cannot have
any application. 221 So.2d 645, 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
It ought to be noted, however, that application of the 1912 repose statute
to an 1899 patent conveying navigable waterbottoms was sustained in State
v. Cenac, 132 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), writs refused, 241 La. 1055,
132 So.2d 928 (1961). See also Miami Corp. v. State Mineral Ed., 122 F. Supp.
489 (W.D. La. 1954) (1883 patent conveying navigable waterbottoms). The
1912 statute has been correctly applied to a number of cases involving patents conveying dry lands. See Fiedler v. Pipes, 236 La. 105, 107 So.2d 409
(1958); McCarthy v. Gonnet, 163 So.2d 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Thiber-
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the court held that the repose statute of 1912 does not apply to
transfers made after the enactment of the oyster statutes.
The decision was grounded, specifically, on an interpretation

of Acts 18921 and 25822 of 1910. Section 1 of Act 189, declaring
that certain waterbottoms "shall be, continue and remain the
property of the State of Louisiana," was interpreted to mean that
the transfer of the property to the levee district was revoked.
This interpretation was based on language in State v. Board of
Commissioners of Caddo Levee District,23 dealing with analogous
declarations in Section 1 of Act 258. In that case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had, indeed, indicated that Act 258 "intended
unequivocally to retake title to the beds [of navigable waters]
where they had not been conveyed to the several levee boards,
and where the rights of third parties had not intervened." 24 Since
plaintiffs could not show any transfer of the property to them
until the patents were issued in 1911, Acts 189 and 258 of 1910
would have operated to "retake title" of the property and reinvest
it in the state. "Hence," the court concluded, "the Levee District
had no title to the property here involved at the date of the two
purported patents ... and therefore such purported patents
could convey no title to Plaquemines Land Company. '25 The
conclusion was bolstered by reference to the language in Section
1 of Act 189, declaring that no sale or conveyance of waterbottoms "shall thereafter be made .. .by any other official, or by
'20
any subordinatepolitical corporation.
This interpretation of Acts 189 and 258 of 1910 may appear
strained. It is difficult to see how the enactment of these statutes
could have resulted in the cancellation of completed transfers of
property to agencies of the state.27 In effect, this decision limits
ville v. Vacher, 159 So.2d 24 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Dupuy v. Shannon, 136
So.2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Diecidue v. Kilpatrick, 94 So.2d 102 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1957). For a case involving transfer of non-navigable waters
see Olin Gas Transmission Corp. v. Harrison, 132 So.2d 721 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961).
21. See La. Acts 1910, No. 189, § 1, now LA. R.S. 56:421 (1950). Act No.
189 of 1910 was superseded by a series of legislative enactments. See La.
Acts 1914, No. 54; La. Acts 1924, No. 139; La. Acts 1926, No. 258; La. Acts 1932,
No. 67.
22. See La. Acts 1910, No. 258, now LA. R.S. 9:1101.
23. 188 La. 1, 175 So. 678 (1937).
24. Id. at 13, 175 So. at 681.
25. 221 So.2d 645, 649 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
26. Id. (Emphasis by the court.)
27. Cf. State v. Board of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee Dist., 188 La. 1, 175
So. 678 (1937).
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the applicability of the Price decision to pre-1886 patents, and
illustrates the desire of lower courts to restrict the implications
of the Pricecase, even at the cost of tenuous reasoning. The Louisiana Supreme Court should re-examine the soundness of the
Price case with the view to overruling it or adopting a narrower
interpretation of the 1912 statute.28 A forceful argument may be
made that the repose statute did not intend to cure patents conveying the beds of navigable waterways, which had been historically declared "out of commerce" and insusceptible of private
ownership.29 In Stevens, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted certiorari, set the summary judgment aside on the ground
that the case involved a genuine dispute as to facts, and remanded
it to the district court.3 0 It might be expected that, after full
trial, the lower courts will reach the same conclusions as before.
Indicatively, in White v. State,31 plaintiff brought a petitory
action to regain possession of two tracts of land located in the
bed of Quarantine Bay, a body of water which has been navigable since 1812. Plaintiff's claim was based on various links, including a sale by the state to the Grand Prairie Levee District
in 1905, a sheriff's sale on the authority of the levee district to
private interests in 1910, and a patent issued by the state to plaintiff's ancestor in title in 1911. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that these links
were nullities and that there was no genuine dispute as to the
facts. The court declared that the 1905 sale to the levee district
was a nullity, because Act 27 of 1904 merely authorized the transfer of dry lands and Act 52 of the same year expressly prohibited
the transfer of navigable waters; that the 1910 sheriff's sale was
a nullity, because after Act 215 of 1908 was enacted no levee board
had authority to transfer lands to private owners and all patents
had to be issued by the state; and that the 1911 patents were
invalid under Acts 189 of 1910 and 258 of the same year, and
could not be rendered valid by application of the 1912 statute.
28. See text accompanying notes 74 and 75 infra.
29. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 757, 74 So.2d 1, 17 (1954)
(dissenting opinion); concurring opinion by Justice Barham in Carter v.
Moore, 258 La. 921, 948, 248 So.2d 813, 823 (1970): "[the] intent . . .
[of Act 62 of 1912] was to provide for validation of only those patents which
had some lawful sanction and not patents to lands insusceptible of alienation."
30. See 255 La. 857, 233 So.2d 542 (1970).
31. 239 So.2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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Patents
According to its terms, the 1912 repose statute applies to

"any patent issued by the State of Louisiana . . . or any transfer by any subdivision of the State." Thus, according to a literal
interpretation, the 1912 statute does not cure by the passage of
six years invalid transfers made by the state or on its behalf by
a subdivision, if the transfers have not been made by virtue of
patents. In CoastalGas ProducingCo. v. State Mineral Board,s 2 a
concursus proceeding, the. issue was whether prescription prevented the state from attacking an 1885 transfer by it as invalid
insofar as it included the bed of a navigable river. The land was
originally part of the sixteenth section school lands granted to
Louisiana by the United States Government, and the sale was
properly made by the parish treasurer in the name of the State
of Louisiana under the authority of the Revised Statutes of 1870.
The act of sale included within its description of the lands the
bed of Bayou Lacassine which has been navigable since 1812.
The court, relying on the doctrine of inherent sovereignty, article
453 of the Civil Code, and on strong public policy, declared that
the sale of state school lands by the parish treasurer did not
convey the ownership of any part of the bed of Bayou Lacassine,
even though the bed was included within the description of the
lands sold. The state could assert its ownership in spite of the
repose statute of 1912, because this statute was inapplicable under
the circumstances. The court pointed out that no patent had
been issued and emphasized "the circumstance that the deed represented a sale by the State (not by a subdivision of it) and that
it was signed by the parish treasurer (not by the Governor and
by the State Register).-88 "[T]he 1912 statute," the court went on,
"protects 'patents' by the State (those signed by the Governor and
State Register, at any rate) and 'transfers' by State subdivisions
-but not transfers by the State. '3 4 The case of California Co. v.
Price3 5 was distinguished on the ground that it involved a transfer made by virtue of a state patent.
Patents issued after 1921 are clearly invalid to the extent
that they purport to transfer navigable waterbottoms.3 6 This is
32. 199 So.2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).

33. Id. at 556.
34. Id. at 557. See also Chapman-Storm Lumber Co. v. Board of Comm'rs,
196 La. 1039, 200 So. 455 (1941); Lovell v. Dulack Cypress Co., Ltd., 31 F.
Supp. 919 (E.D. La. 1940).

35. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
36. See LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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presumably so even if the post 1921 patent is issued on the basis
of a pre-1921 land warrant and in replacement of a defective
patent. In Lewis v. Louisiana,7 the state had issued a defective
patent in 1862, and subsequent holders of the patent applied to
the state, under Act 104 of 1888, for a land warrant to be located
upon lands of the same class as those distributed by the defective
patent. This was promptly done. In 1942, application was made
under the warrant for patents in Calcasieu Parish, and a patent
was issued in 1943. The new patent contained no express reservation of minerals to the state, and years later the patentees instituted action against the state to establish title to the mineral
rights in the lands. The state argued that Article IV, Section 2
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 excluded conveyance of
the mineral rights to the patentees. Plaintiffs, however, contended that the constitutional provision was inapplicable because
the land had been conveyed on the basis of rights accrued in
1862, and that the repose statute of 1912 precluded contest as to the
validity of the patent. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
constitutional provision was clearly applicable and that there was
no vested right under the facts or the law. The repose statute, the
court declared, "must yield to the Constitution of 1921, which
embodies the clearly stated public policy that mineral rights in
all lands sold by the state must be reserved. The state cannot
lose by prescription that which it cannot constitutionally alienate."38s This reasoning is clearly applicable by analogy to cases
involving transfer of navigable waterbottoms.
Signed by the Governor
According to its terms, the 1912 repose statute applies to
patents "duly signed by the Governor of the State and the Register of the State Land Office." It would seem, therefore, that
application of the statute presupposes a showing that the patent
37. 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (1963).
38. Id. at 1049, 156 So.2d at 434. In King v. Board of Comm'rs, 148 So.2d
138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writ refused, 224 La. 118, 150 So.2d 585 (1963),
the court held that prior to 1921 prescription ran against mineral rights
held by a levee board. In this case, property had been transferred to a
levee board in 1911 and plaintiffs claimed title to the same property, including minerals, by virtue of a sheriff's sale in 1912. The court held for plaintiffs and declared that "Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of 1921,
must be limited strictly to property sold by the State since its adoption,
and that since absolute title to property was in the Levee Board In 1911,
including fee title to said land together with the mineral rights in, on or
under the property in the instant suit, the Levee Board has lost the mineral rights to said property by prescription." Id. at 144.
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was signed as required by law. In Valvoline Oil Co. v. Concordia
Parish School Board,3 9 however, the court presumed that the
original patent had been validly issued and signed. Thus, the
validity of an 1861 patent that had conveyed public school lands
to private individuals was upheld. In the same case, an attempted
cancellation of the original patent by the state in 1917 was declared invalid, by application of the jurisprudential rule that
"patents, valid on their face, are presumed valid until revoked
by judgment of court in judicial proceedings instituted for that
purpose." 0
Suits or Proceedings
According to its terms, the 1912 repose statute applies to "all
suits or proceedings

. . .

to vacate and annul" state patents.

Question has arisen, therefore, whether the statute prevents the
state from cancelling a defective patent without recourse to judicial proceedings. A literal interpretation of the statute would
obviously support the view that it applies to "suits or proceedings" for the annulment of patents and has nothing to do with
cancellations of defective patents by the administrative authorities. Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have declared that patents
valid on their face may only be annulled "in court proceedings
instituted for that purpose, '

41

and that a cancellation by the ad-

ministrative authorities is without effect. Moreover, in Carter v.
Moore,42 the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held that the
1912 repose statute excludes cancellations of defective patents
by the administrative authorities. The judgment was reversed
by the Louisiana Supreme Court on other grounds.43 In the view
of the supreme court, the state must normally bring a "suit""4
for the correction of a deficient patent, but such a suit is not required when the patent has been corrected at the request of one
of the patentees.
Eroded Lands
The repose statute of 1912, as interpreted in CaliforniaCo. v.
39. 216 So.2d 702 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), writ refused, 253 La. 645, 219
So.2d 176 (1969).
40. Id. at 706.
41. Valvoline Oil Co. v. Concordia Parish School Bd., 216 So.2d 702, 708
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1968), writ refused, 253 La. 645, 219 So.2d 176 (1969).
42. 234 So.2d 823 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
43. 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813 (1971).
44. Id. at 932, 248 So.2d at 817.
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Price,45 precludes contest by the state of the validity of patents
conveying navigable waterbottoms. In the Price case, however,
the court left open the question whether the state acquires the
ownership of patented lands that have been eroded by navigable
waters. This result appears to be a natural consequence of the
rule in Miami Corp. v. State.46 Indeed, in State v. Scott,4 7 the
Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reached the conclusion that
if the land described in a patent was marsh land subject to overflow it ought to be governed by the Miami case; conversely, if the
land was under water at the time of the issuance of the patent,
it ought to be governed by the Price decision.
Erroneous or Ambiguous Descriptions
The question whether patents containing erroneous or ambiguous descriptions are valid and unassailable was unanswered
until recently in Louisiana. In Carter v. Moore,4s however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court declared that Act 62 of 1912 does not
bar "an otherwise timely suit by the State to secure correction
of the ambiguous or void description: The demand and object
. .is to carry out the mutual intention of the parties as to the
description of the area patented, not to take away any area actually described by it."'49 Plaintiff's ancestor in title had applied
in 1881 for a state patent covering FractionalSection 21, Township 13 South, Range 4 West. The patent was issued to the applicant, but, through clerical error, it purported to convey Fractional South-Half Section 21. The error was material: The governmental division shown by the official survey as fractional
section 21 included 45 acres of overflow lands adjacent to Grand
Lake whereas the south half of section 21, which apparently
had never been surveyed, would include 320 acres in the bed of
Grand Lake. The clerical error was discovered in 1962 by a successor of the original patentee, and, at his request, a corrective
patent was issued containing 45 acres of overflow lands in accordance with the original application. In 1963, all heirs of the
original patentee joined in a mandamus suit; they prayed for an
order compelling the issuance of a new corrective patent voiding
*

45. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
46. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
47. 185 So.2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 485, 187

So.2d 450 (1966).

See also concurring opinion by Judge Redmann in Stevens

v. State Mineral Board, 221 So.2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
48. 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813 (1971).
49. Id. at 932, 248 So.2d at 817.
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the 1962 correction and recognizing them as owners of the south
half of section 21. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the
court of appeal reversed. 50 On certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. 51
The narrow issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court was
this:
"Where an original patent had contained an erroneous
and ambiguous description, and this had subsequently been
corrected at the instance of a successor to the patentee, does
mandamus now lie to compel state officials to issue a new
corrective patent reinstating the original ambiguous (and
'52
erroneous) description?
Plaintiffs contended that the state officials had a ministerial duty
to act, and that the extra-judicial correction of the 1881 patent had
the effect of annulling it insofar as it conferred title to them of a
part of the bed of Grand Lake. In their view, the correction was
forbidden by Act 62 of 1912, as interpreted by California Co. v.
Price.
In a well-considered opinion by Justice Tate, the court held
that the state officials could not be compelled to reinstate the
original description. Relying on a long line of decisions, the court
pointed out that a government survey creates, not merely identifies, the township sections and the boundaries thereof. Since the
only governmental survey subdivision pertaining to the area at
issue was fractional section 21, containing the 45 acres of overflow land adjacent to Grand Lake, and since no official survey
had created any south half, let alone any fractional south half,
the court concluded that the description in the original patent
was at least ambiguous; hence, the defendant officials were not
required to reinstate it.
Turning to the repose statute of 1912, the court held that it
was inapplicable. The 1881 patent did not describe any portion
of the bed of Grand Lake: "It did not describe any governmental
subdivision, for there was (and is) no 'south half' of Section 21,
nor any 'fractional south half' thereof . . . ." "The description
of the land patented as being in the non-existent 'fractional south
half' of Section 21," the court went on, "was ambiguous, if not
50. Carter v. Moore, 234 So.2d 823 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
51. 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813 (1971).
52. Id. at 931, 248 So.2d at 816.
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void." 58 Hence, the court concluded that the 1912 statute did not
bar an otherwise timely suit by the state to correct the ambiguous
or void description. The narrow holding is merely that a mandamus proceeding will not lie to compel state officials to re-issue
a patent with an ambiguous or erroneous description, when the
original patent was cancelled at the request of a successor to the
patentee. Broad language in the majority opinion, however, a
monumental concurring opinion by Justice Barham, and Justice
Tate's concurrence in denial of rehearing, indicate that patents
containing erroneous or ambiguous descriptions are generally
assailable and suggest the possible overruling of CaliforniaCo. v.
Price. It is for this reason that the Carter case is much more
important than its peculiar facts might suggest.
In his scholarly and persuasive concurring opinion, Justice
Barham made perhaps the most complete and authoritative survey of Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence governing navigable waterbottoms to date. He stated at the outset that the
"fundamental, important, and pressing problem 5'

4

before the

court was a reconsideration of the Price decision, and then
proceeded methodically to determine the development of Louisiana waterbottoms law from colonial times to the enactment
of Act 62 of 1912, and beyond. He concluded that articles
449, 450, and 453 of the Civil Code have mandated the inalienability of navigable waterbottoms and that this inalienability
could be abrogated only by express constitutional or statutory
authority. Since Act 62 of 1912 was not such an authority, the
conclusion of the court was "built upon a tenuous and untenable
foundation" and was "inversely pyramided."'5 Therefore, the
Price decision ought to be judicially overruled. A buttressing
reason for the judicial overruling of Price was also found in Act
727 of 1954,56 which ought to be regarded as constitutional. Quite
apart from its technical aspects, this concurring opinion deserves
attention in Louisiana as an example of civilian methodology
at its best.
Concurring in the denial of an application for rehearing,
Justice Tate reiterated his conviction that the Carter case was
correctly decided on a narrow issue, and concurred with Justice
Barham's view that the Price decision should be overruled if and
53. Id. at 931-32, 248 So.2d at 816-17.
54. Id. at 934, 248 So.2d at 817.
55. Id. at 962, 248 So.2d at 827.

56. See note 57 4nfra.
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when the question is presented to the court. He further took
care to point out that in case the Price decision is overruled, innocent parties ought to be accorded the same rights as good faith
possessors and that judicial determinations already made would
be covered by the effect of res judicata.
Effect of Act 727 of 1954
In order to resolve authoritatively the question of the effect
of patents conveying the beds of navigable water bodies, the Louisiana legislature enacted in 1954 Act 727. 57 The act declares
that:
"It has been the public policy of the State of Louisiana at
all times since its admission into the Union that all navigable
waters and the beds of the same within its boundaries are
common or public things and insusceptible of private ownership; that no act of the Legislature of Louisiana has been
enacted in contravention of said policy, and that the intent
of the Legislature of this State at the time of the enactment
of Act 62 of the year 1912, now appearing as R.S. 9:5661, and
continuously thereafter was and is at this present time to
ratify and confirm only those patents which conveyed or
purported to convey public lands susceptible of private ownership of the nature and character, the alienation or transfer
of which was authorized by law but not patents or transfers
which purported to convey
or transfer navigable waters and
5' 8'
the beds of the same.
This act has not yet been applied by Louisiana courts.
In State v. Cenac,59 a majority of the Louisiana Supreme
Court refused to grant writs when a lower court followed the
Price decision and confirmed the validity of an 1899 patent conveying to private interests the beds of navigable waterbottoms.
Neither the district court nor the court of appeal had passed on
the pertinence of the 1954 act. In a concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Fournet expressed the view that the second Price decisione had already disposed of arguments based on Act 727 of
1954. In another concurring opinion, Justice Summers expressed
57. Now LA. R.S. 9:1107-09 (1950).

58. Id.
59. 241 La. 1055, 132 So.2d 928 (1960).
60. California Co. v. Price, 234 La. 338, 99 So.2d 743 (1957).
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the view that the 1954 act cannot change the meaning of the 1912
repose statute, because this would be contrary to the principle
of separation of powers; he declared that "it does not lie within
the domain of the lawmakers to interpret their own laws."6 1 In
a dissenting opinion, Justice Sanders observed that the 1954 act
is "clothed with a presumption of constitutionality, '62 and in
a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Hawthorne indicated that
"[i]f by the denial of this writ the court intends to declare the
act unconstitutional, the case becomes even more unusual and
without precedent."" Finally, in his brief but vigorous dissenting
opinion, Justice Hamlin argued that "the jurisprudence should
' 4
be corrected or changed as to conform to public policy. 6
Questions may arise as to the constitutionality of Act 727 of
1954. Specifically, it may be argued that this act is obnoxious to
the principle of separation of powers and to the prohibition
against non-retroactivity of legislation. These arguments, though
not without foundation, may be overcome.
In systems of codified laws, the authority of the legislature
to interpret its enactments is a correlative of its power to legislate. Logically, the legislature ought to be the appropriate agency
to clarify the meaning of statements that purport to express the
collective will. According to an ancient maxim, ejus est interpretari cuius est condere, that is, the task of interpreting the
laws belongs properly to one who has authority to make them.6 5
In France, in the period following the promulgation of the Code
Civil, the ultimate authority for the interpretation of laws was
vested in the legislative assembly, in accordance with a rigid
application of the principle of separation of powers. In the event
of conflicting determinations of the Court of Cassation with other
tribunals, the question about the meaning of a controversial text
was put to the legislative assembly for resolution by interpretative legislation. This procedure, known as "reference to the legislative body," still exists in theory but it is no longer used on
61. State v. Cenac, 241 La. 1055, 1061, 132 So.2d 928, 930 (1960).
62. Id. at 1078, 132 So. 2d at 936. See also concurring opinion by Justice
Barham in Carter v. Moore, 258 La. 921, 962, 248 So.2d 813, 827 (1971): "I am
of the opinion that the statute [Act 727 of 1954] is constitutional"; cf. Herbert & Lazarus, Survey of the 1954 Louisiana Legislation-LegislationAffecting the Civil Code, 15 LA. L. Rsv. 9, 21-25 (1954).
63. State v. Cenac, 241 La. 1055, 1076, 132 So.2d 928, 935 (1960).
64. Id. at 1077, 132 So.2d at 936.
65. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVm LAW TRzAISic, no. 155 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959).
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account of inherent delays and other difficulties. Quite apart
from this procedure, however, interpretative legislation is enacted in France either on the government's own motion or as a
result of petitions of interested persons. 0 In the United States,
the authority of Congress to enact interpretative legislation has
been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. 7
Expressions may be found in Louisiana decisions that the
interpretation of laws is exclusively a judicial function and that
the legislature lacks authority to enact interpretative legislation.
This view is allegedly based on the principle of separation of
powers; yet, in France, rigid application of the principle of separation of powers has led to the opposite conclusion-that the ultimate authority for the interpretation of laws is vested in the
legislative body. It is true, however, that the principle of separation of powers leaves no room for the adjudication of cases by
the legislature, and this may be the true holding of certain Louisiana decisions.6 The principle of the separation of powers does
not exclude the authority of the legislature to enact clearly interpretative laws, clarifying the meaning of previously enacted
texts outside the context of litigation. Of course, it is a different
matter when the legislature actually amends previously enacted
legislation by laws designated as interpretative. This again may
be an improper exercise of power tending to attribute, contrary
to constitutional guarantees, retroactive effect to new legislation.
In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that Act 727 of 1954
does not violate the principle of the separation of powers. 69 There
remains, however, the question of whether the act is unconstitutional as retroactive legislation. In Louisiana, in addition to
the principle of non-retroactivity of laws established in article
8 of the Civil Code, which may be superseded by subsequent
legislation, certain types of retroactive legislation are contrary
66. See Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom
Doctrine, and Precedent in French Law, 18 LA. L. Rnv. 235, 239 (1958).
67. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1960): "Subsequent legislation declaring the intent
of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction."
68. See, e.g., State Licensing Bd. of Contractors v. State Civil Service
Comm'n, 240 La. 331, 123 So.2d 76 (1960).
69. See concurring opinion by Justice Barhan in Carter v. Moore, 258
La. 921, 960-61, 248 So.2d 813, 827 (1971): "If ever the Legislature were entitled to have an interpretative act upheld as not being an invasion of the
Judicial function or an abrogation of the theory of separation of powers of
government, certainly this legislation [Act 727 of 1954] should be accorded
that status."
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to the state and federal constitutions. Thus, the prohibition
against non-retroactivity may be both a qualified constitutional
guarantee and a rule of statutory interpretation. The Louisiana
Constitution forbids, specifically, ex post facto penal laws, laws
impairing the obligation of contracts, and laws divesting vested
rights without previous just and fair compensation." The Louisiana legislature, therefore, may constitutionally enact retroactive
laws as to matters falling outside the constitutional prohibitions. 71
According to civilian theory, truly interpretative legislation
does not violate the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This
is justified on the ground that this legislation does not establish
new rules; it merely determines the meaning of existing laws
and may thus be applied to facts occurring prior to its promulgation. In these circumstances, there is an apparent rather than
real retroactivity because it is the original rather than the
interpretative law that establishes rights and duties. 72 It is another question, of course, when the legislature misuses the technique of interpretation and a law containing new rules is branded
as interpretative.
It is submitted that Act 727 of 1954 constitutes truly interpretative legislation. It does not purport to attribute a new meaning to the repose statute of 1912 or to establish new rights and
duties.7 3 On the contrary, it merely confirms a strong public
policy, in existence since colonial days, and attributes to the
1912 statute the meaning that it had until the Louisiana Supreme
Court rendered the Price decision. If the Louisiana Supreme
Court were prepared to overrule this decision, there would be
no serious objection to the constitutionality of the 1954 legislation.
70. See LA. CONST. art. 4, § 15. See also id. art. 1, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 10.

71. As early as 1855, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared in Municipality No. One v. Wheeler & Blake, 10 La. Ann. 745 (1855) that "retrospective laws In civil matters do not violate the Constitution, unless they tend
to divest vested rights or to Impair the obligation of contracts." See also
Long v. Northeast Soil Conservation Dist., 226 La. 824, 77 So.2d 408 (1955).
72. See 1 PLANIOL, Cvm LAW TREATISE no. 179 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
73. See concurring opinion by Justice Barham In Carter v. Moore, 258
La. 921, 248 So. 2d 813, 827 (1971): ". . . the act of 1954 has not changed any
law; it is not a new law; it is not a new rule of law; it does not divest
vested rights or impair contractual obligations.
"... If the 1954 legislation is accepted as an interpretative act and not
as new law, there is no problem of impairment of contracts or divesting
vested rights in violation of constitutional provisions."
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Conclusion

A survey of Louisiana legislation and recent jurisprudence
dealing with the validity of state patents conveying navigable
waterbottoms to private interests leads to the conclusion that the
interpretation of Act 62 of 1912 is not yet judicially settled. The
ill-starred Price decision rests, indeed, on a "weak jurisprudential foundation," 4 is contrary to the whole spirit of Louisiana
legislation, and does violence to fundamental precepts of Louisiana property law by allowing public things to be privately
owned. Lower courts have consistently voiced opposition to the
Price rule, and have sought ways and means to limit the scope
of its authority as a binding precedent. In Carter v. Moore, the
majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in effect, established
a major exception to the Price decision, and Justices Tate and
Barham voiced their conviction that Price ought to be overruled.
Moreover, Justices Hamlin and Sanders have expressed in the
past their opposition to the Price decision; 75 thus, should the
appropriate case arise, a majority might be formed for the dispatch of Price. If, as it seems, the overruling of Price is quite
probable, concern ought to be expressed for the rights of innocent parties who might have relied on Price. Perhaps the Louisiana legislature should take the lead and should establish a special regime for these parties; in the absence of legislative action,
the courts would be in a position to fashion solutions along the
lines suggested by Justices Hamlin and Tate.
With Price on the way out, much of the learned discussion
concerning the validity of state patents conveying navigable
waterbottoms to private interests loses its object. An issue that
has been blown entirely out of proportion in the state might
finally be set to rest: Navigable waterbottoms which have been
historically declared to be public, will continue to be insusceptible of private ownership. Moreover, Act 62 of 1912 may finally
be relegated to its intended function, that is, it may be treated
as a statute of repose covering state patents other than those
conveying navigable waterbottoms.7 6
74. Id. at 954, 248 So.2d at 825.

75. See dissenting opinions by Justices Hamlin and Sanders in State v.
Cenac, 241 La. 1055, 1076, 1078, 132 So.2d 928, 930, 936 (1961).
76. The 1912 repose statute has been correctly applied to a number of
cases involving transfers of non-navigable waterbodies or dry lands. See,
e.g., Fiedler v. Pipes, 236 La. 105, 107 So.2d 409 (1958); McCarthy v. Gonnet,
163 So.2d 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Olin Gas Transmission Corp. v. Harrison, 132 So.2d 721 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).

